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ABSTRACT 
 
SVETOSLAV DERDERYAN: Corruption on the ropes? The effectiveness of EU 
leverage in fighting corruption in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova, Gary Marks, and Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
 
The implementation of the 31 chapters of the aquis communitaire has been 
credited with the overall alignment of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) post-
communist candidates’ systems of governance with Western European standards. 
During the accession period CEE countries had huge incentives to comply with EU 
institutions. However, these incentives decreased once membership was attained and 
the EU’s leverage correspondingly diminished. This study finds convincing evidence 
that this was not the case with corruption. Although not including corruption either 
in the acquis or of the Copenhagen criteria, the EU was able to demand reforms that 
served to curb corruption levels during the both the candidacy period and after 
membership. The relative loss of leverage after accession was compensated by 
continued leverage in terms of conditional EU funds, increased linkages and 
socializations effects, and spillover effects from the removal of the state from the 
economy and improvements in the legal systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s (EU) eastern enlargement stands as one of the greatest 
political achievements of the modern era. The two waves of the enlargement in 2004 
and 2007 made the Union the world’s largest commercial and financial market, with 
a population exceeding 490 million people and a GDP of more than $13 trillion. The 
significance of this historic event, however, extends far beyond geography, 
demography and economics and has deep symbolic implications. As Romano Prodi 
put it, “Five decades after our great project of European integration began, we are 
celebrating the fact that Europeans are no longer kept apart by artificial ideological 
barriers.“ This was a moment when after more than a decade of difficult transitions, 
10 post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries finally broke free 
from their communist legacies and joined the ranks of the developed world. 
Authoritarianism and central planning were now buried in the past. Democracy and 
the free market were “the only game in town.” 
However, institutional developments affected by the accession process have 
had varying levels of success. Although there have been encouraging results in many 
areas, there is still ongoing debate about the readiness of some of these newly 
accepted countries to be full members. The evolution of the fight against corruption 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) provides a useful illustration of this concern. 
This study, however, refutes the skepticism about these countries’ success in trying 
to contain corruption and shows that both before and after membership, CEE 
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 countries made substantial absolute gains in curbing corruption levels. Although 
corruption was neither part of the acquis nor of the Copenhagen criteria, it was an 
issue that received tremendous visibility during the accession period through the 
Commission Regular Reports and the attention of the media in the CEE countries. 
Taking advantage of its leverage, the EU was able to demand reforms that served to 
decrease corruption levels during the accession period. After accession gains in the 
fight against corruption were not negated as the relative loss of leverage in this time 
period was compensated by positive pressures coming from continued leverage 
(Structural and Cohesion Funds and Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
reports), increased linkage (socialization effects leading to higher demands for 
accountability of public officials), and spillover effects (reduction of the role of the 
state in the economy and improvements in the legal system) from implementing the 
acquis communitaire in other areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
II. BACKGROUND 
 
The task of reforming the CEE countries during the accession process was a 
challenging one. Overall, however, the EU’s membership conditionality has been 
widely perceived as a highly effective means of influence. The promise of 
membership combined with the implementation of the 31 chapters of the aquis 
communitaire during the negotiations phase of the accession period has been credited 
with the overall alignment of the ten post-communist countries’ systems of 
governance, economies and legal structures with Western European standards. There 
is no doubt, therefore, that during the accession period CEE countries had huge 
incentives to comply and collaborate with EU institutions. As a number of scholars 
have argued, however, these incentives may have decreased once membership was 
attained and the EU’s leverage correspondingly diminished.  
There are some examples of issue areas where compliance has indeed 
declined after accession, most evidently with respect to party platforms and 
economic and monetary union (Vachudova 2008; Johnson 2008). At the same time, 
there is plenty of evidence of continued compliance, such as in the areas of bank 
privatization and pension reform (Epstein 2008; Orenstein 2008). It is therefore 
unclear to what extent the EU has had a system-wide impact and continues to cause 
political and economic reform in new members after accession. In order to try to  
shed more light on these ongoing debates I focus on the area of governance which is 
most likely to engender skepticism – government efforts to fight corruption. 
There are many reasons that justify focusing on corruption in particular. 
Corruption is important because it undermines democratic institutions, reduces 
economic growth, and challenges liberal democracy – “as political elites violate the 
legal limits of their power, citizens lose trust in state institutions, and civil society is 
oppressed and co-opted by powerful networks” (Vachudova 2009). Furthermore, it 
endangers the cohesion of the Union in a way few other governance challenges do. 
First, if the Structural and Cohesion Funds that become available to new members 
after accession are not fairly allocated, they fail to adequately address the economic 
and infrastructural challenges these countries face and delay their effective 
integration in the Union. Second, as corruption scandals in CEE countries make 
more and more headlines, public support for the Union’s integration and further 
enlargement diminishes as both eastern and western European publics become 
skeptical of the EU. Thus, corruption is an important issue which deserves the 
attention of both policy-makers and academics. 
Many scholars suggest that post-accession compliance would be maintained 
in cases where dismantling institutions is difficult and domestic costs in general 
remain high (Epstein and Seledmeier 2008; Schimmelfennig; Vachudova 2005; 
Kelley 2004). But Epstein and Seledmeier (2008) argue that the power of EU 
conditionality would be the weakest in areas where the EU never applied specific 
conditionality, such as rules that are neither part of the acquis, nor of the 
Copenhagen criteria. Such is the case with corruption. Although the membership 
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criteria do call, somewhat broadly, for developing institutional capacities to curb 
corruption and organized crime, corruption is neither part of the acquis, nor of the 
Copenhagen criteria. Some scholarly evidence suggests that this is not coincidental 
since there was never a consensus among the older member states to push or 
emphasize the issue (Vachudova 2009) and some Council members systematically 
tried to avoid it.  
Jacoby (2004) also contributes to the argument that the density of EU rules in 
each area of reform predetermines their success and longevity. He compares regional 
and healthcare policy and finds that the sector characterized by more extensive 
external pressure (stronger EU conditionality), regional policy, made greater 
progress towards approximating Western European models. The high level of outside 
incentives and the relative scarcity of domestic actors in the case of regional policy 
(as opposed to healthcare) compelled and enabled some CEE governments to 
implement the EU’s regional policy rules fairly and faithfully. Thus, Jacoby would 
also expect to find modest EU-driven progress fighting corruption since the density 
of EU rules is low.  
As stated earlier, if we look at the acquis or the Copenhagen criteria, 
corruption is characterized by a relatively low level of outside incentives. Thus, one 
can legitimately expect only modest improvements in corruption levels during the 
candidacy period and perhaps backsliding after accession when EU leverage 
diminishes. Yet, as mentioned earlier, I find robust evidence for the positive impact 
of both EU candidacy and membership on corruption levels in CEE countries.  
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I will explore the question of how corruption levels were influenced by the 
EU in several stages. In Part 1 I will provide an overview of the main literature about 
the impact of the EU on governance in CEE countries during and after accession. In 
this section I will also present the theoretical framework that I utilize to formulate 
my hypotheses. Part 2 will present the statistical framework of the study including a 
discussion on the choice and operationalization of variables and the results from the 
time series analyses. Part 3 will discuss the exact causal mechanisms that may be in 
play before and after accession as well as some possible alternative explanations. 
Finally, the conclusion will summarize the main arguments and findings and discuss 
their implications for EU policy-making.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The issues of non-compliance and backsliding have already received a fair 
amount of attention both from policymakers and academics. Invited to a hearing at 
the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2007, expert witness Charles Gati 
pointed out a number of ways in which CEE countries are backsliding: right-wing 
inspired riots in Hungary, growing skepticism toward politics in the Czech Republic, 
a popular backlash against the government that engineered the economic miracle in 
Slovakia, the personalization of politics in Poland (the Kaczynski twins), general 
leadership deficit in the region, resistance to the next round of economic reforms, 
growing inequality and skepticism about the virtues of capitalism. Concerning 
corruption in particular deputy prosecutor general at the Court of Appeals at Ghent, 
De Pauw wrote a scathing Expert Report on Romania. In the wake of the 
enlargement he claimed that there are many ways through which the government and 
the judiciary have undermined anti-corruption initiatives. To validate his criticism he 
cited a number of amendments to existing laws that would make high-profile anti-
corruption prosecutions improbable.  
Some academics have also identified areas where the impact of EU 
conditionality is not as lasting as most people wish. Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) 
emphasizes that challenges like populism and nationalism unfortunately do not end 
with accession and are likely to continue playing an important role in the domestic 
political arenas of the CEE countries. Rupnik (2007) also notes a populist backlash 
against accession in much of the region, but admits that this effect is not likely to 
persist over time. Sasse (2008) finds that there are still on-going practical problems 
with the application of minority rights rules, despite some demonstrated formal legal 
compliance. Vachudova (2008) shows that although political parties moderated their 
agendas to bring them more in line with the EU during the candidacy period, 
parameters of competition broadened again post-accession as party programs became 
increasingly more nationalist and culturally conservative. Finally, Kochenov (2008) 
demonstrates that the Commission ended up establishing a low threshold for meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria by merging the concepts of democracy and rule of law in its 
annual assessments of the candidate countries. He also criticizes the vagueness of 
some governance criteria, such as the concept of the rule of law, since it was never 
made clear whether it includes any requirements pertaining to corruption, and 
candidate countries never received specific instructions on how to combat this 
endemic governance challenge.  
Nevertheless, there is also a large body of literature identifying a range of 
issues where compliance was systematic and endured after membership. For example 
Sedelmeier (2008) finds convincing evidence for the continuation of implementation 
of ЕU law among the newest members of the Union. He even argues that compliance 
after accession was in fact stronger in the new members than in the old members. 
Epstein (2008) adds to this “positivist” literature by delineating patterns of increasing 
openness to foreign direct investment in the banking sectors of these countries. 
Johnson (2008), then, defies some of the more critical assessments of monetary 
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integration and shows that there is definite convergence on some, though not all, key 
indicators. Ivanov (forthcoming) admits that after accession Romania regressed from 
its previous achievements against corruption, and Bulgaria remained reluctant to 
prosecute senior officials or confront organized crime. Nevertheless, he shows that 
the European Commission has continued its monitoring activities, and its ability to 
freeze funds has maintained a modicum of pressure for reform which has led to some 
positive results. Falkner and Treib (2008) explore the pattern of non-compliance with 
EU law in the CEE member states and find that it is actually similar to that of some 
existing members. This suggests that there is no evidence for a sui generis reaction to 
any pre-accession overstretch. Finally Kelley (2006) and Dimitrova (2002) find that 
the EU’s influence on minority protections and strengthening the state’s 
administrative capacity has been substantial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
IV. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Although many authors have made the case that the power of EU 
conditionality would be the weakest in areas where the EU never applied specific 
conditionality (such as rules that are neither part of the acquis, nor of the 
Copenhagen criteria), I argue that the issue of corruption always received a high 
level of visibility (from the media and from the Regular Reports) and this allowed 
EU leverage to introduce powerful incentives to try to curb it during the accession 
period. Furthermore, in the case of the eastern enlargement EU leverage was 
unprecedented and was thus likely to significantly affect areas, such as corruption, 
that were not explicitly emphasized.  
Pridham (2005) points to four factors that increased the power of EU 
conditionality. First, he emphasizes that as they were shaking off the bonds of 
communism in the early 1990’s, the CEE countries decided to attempt a total 
overhaul of their political, economic, and social systems. There was hardly any 
aspect of public or private life that remained untouched. Total overhaul is not easy in 
an environment of falling incomes, weak institutional capacity, and insufficient 
familiarity with modern practices. In such a difficult and all-encompassing effort, it 
was inevitable that the CEE countries would falter in some aspects of reform – and it 
therefore made sense to seek the expert help of the EU. For example, Bulgaria, 
which experienced a hyperinflation crisis in 1996-97 decided to implement a 
currency board and deliberately surrender the conduct of monetary policy to the 
German and, later, the European Central Bank. The main point here is that countries 
undergoing complete systemic change are more in need of EU help and are therefore 
more responsive to EU conditionality than in other circumstances, such as during the 
southern enlargement in the 1980s.  
Second, the onset of conditionality roughly coincided with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and the security imperative was probably high on the minds of CEE 
elites. In this unstable international environment, EU conditionality may have been 
more effective, as the perceived geo-political benefits for candidate states may have 
been greater. Third, the EU’s Fifth Enlargement involved a record 12 countries (the 
ten that joined in 2004 plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007). 
Competition among all these applicant countries was fierce, and the media in any 
given country were reporting on the progress of the rest of the pack. Importantly, 
corruption was always a salient issue receiving special attention in the Regular 
Reports of the Commission. Government officials were then under intense pressure 
from their publics to perform, and the public backlash in the countries that were not 
invited to begin negotiations in late 1997 was severe.  
Finally, Pridham argues, most CEE candidates were small states, who wanted 
to become part of powerful organization like the EU. If size and leverage are 
negatively correlated in international relations, then the domestic environments of 
the CEE countries were quite conducive to the effects of EU conditionality. Thus, 
during the entire candidacy period the relationship between CEE countries and the 
EU was characterized by what Vachudova has termed asymmetrical 
interdependence: CEE countries needed the EU much more than the EU needed 
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them (Vachudova 2005) and this vastly superior bargaining position allowed the EU 
to influence candidates in ways that went even beyond the acquis and the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
Thus, in light of the unprecedented power of EU leverage during the 
accession period and the high visibility of the issue of corruption, in these countries, 
I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Corruption levels start improving as soon as a country is given the green light to 
be able to join the EU (credible candidate status) and this trend remains sustainable 
during the entire candidacy period. 
 
As stated earlier, many authors have made the case that a slowdown or even 
backsliding is likely to occur in the post-accession period due to the decrease of 
leverage after the ultimate reward of membership has been granted. There are three 
mechanisms, however, that compensate for this loss of leverage in this period and 
suggest that corruption levels may actually continue to improve. As Levitz and Pop-
Eleches argue, EU leverage, though transformed, remained an important force after 
membership (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2009). Greater dependence on trade and 
especially the potential threat of freezing the massive Structural and Cohesion funds 
available to new poorer members acted as a powerful incentive for elites to stay on 
the reform path. Additionally, greater linkage and exposure to the West for both 
elites and citizens was associated with higher expectations of government 
performance and served as an additional pressure to continue compliance. Finally, 
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spillover effects associated with the gradual removal of the state from the economy, 
improvements in the legal system and strengthened regulatory institutions also 
contributed to fewer opportunities for corrupt behavior in the political realm.  
Thus, in light of these arguments I propose the following hypothesis related 
to the post-accession period: 
 
H2: Progress in curbing corruption continues after accession, even as EU leverage 
becomes weaker.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
V. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Operationalization of the dependent variable - Corruption 
         
 In order to specify the dependent variable, corruption, I refer to the Control of 
Corruption (CC) index, which is part of the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators (WGI). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM), who have developed 
the index, define CC as an index “measuring perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.” (p.8 
KKM). The index covers 212 countries and territories for the years 1996, 1998, 
2000, and 2002-2007.  The scores for the years 1997, 1999, and 2001 are manually 
constructed by averaging the adjoining years.  
The CC index is based on a number of individual variables measuring 
perceptions of corruption, representing 35 separate data sources produced by 32 
different organizations from around the world1. Importantly, all WGI indicators are 
based on subjective or perceptions-based data on governance reflecting the 
perspectives of a wide range of informed stakeholders including thousands of private 
individual and firm survey respondents, experts working for the private sector, 
NGOs, and public sector agencies. The aggregation technique KKM use is an 
                                                 
1 Since the number of data sources varies from year to year, critics of the CC and the CPI have made 
the case that comparisons across time are inconsistent and should not be done. However, KKM have 
argued that since the measure is constructed for the entire dataset at the same time, levels of 
corruption at different time points can be considered methodologically comparable.  
unobserved components model which allows for the extraction of the common 
component of the multiple corruption measures and thereby assigns a single, annual 
corruption score to every country in the world. The main advantage of this approach 
is that the aggregate indicators are more informative about unobserved governance 
than any individual data source. The aggregate corruption scores are then scaled to 
follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in 
each period. This means that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher 
scores corresponding to better outcomes. The measure is constructed for the entire 
dataset at the same time, so that levels of corruption at different time points can be 
considered comparable. The dependent variable in this study is defined as the annual 
level of a country’s aggregate Control of Corruption score, as calculated from the 
publicly available dataset provided by the World Bank.   
The CC is one of the most popular indexes measuring corruption. This is not 
surprising given the indisputable advantages of the index – a broader country 
coverage than any individual data source on corruption and a systematic aggregation 
of corruption data from over 30 different data sources. Nevertheless, the CC is often 
criticized by politicians, the popular media and even academics for the fact that the 
index is based on subjective perception-based data and not on objective measures of 
corruption. KKM defend the appropriateness of CC pointing out at several 
considerations.  
First of all, perceptions do matter immensely because political and economic 
actors often base their actions on their perceptions, impressions, and views. Thus, if 
citizens, for example, believe that the courts are ineffective or the police are corrupt, 
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they are likely to downplay their importance as institutions and avoid their services. 
Furthermore, if investors believe that the investment climate in a given country is 
inappropriate, they will withdraw their investments even if the fundamentals of the 
national economy look good on paper. Secondly, as far as corruption is concerned, 
there are few alternatives to relying on perceptions data since by definition 
corruption leaves no ‘paper trail’ that can be captured objectively. Thirdly, KKM 
point that potential problems with expert assessments, such as, that such assessments 
can sometimes be tainted by ideological biases, or be biased towards the views of the 
business elite or by the recent economic performance of the countries in question 
(i.e. so called 'halo effects') are tested for empirically and proven to be statistically 
insignificant. Last, even when fact-based data are actually available, the de jure 
notion of national laws may differ substantially from the de facto reality that exists 
on the ground. Additionally, the legal systems of different countries often define 
instances of corruption differently, so a measure that may seem objective, such as 
relative share of verdicts for cases of corruption, may actually be highly inconsistent 
across countries. 
Thinking about the implications of this last point is particularly important. 
While looking at corruption-related indictments and convictions across different 
countries and legal systems makes little sense, such data are an important part of 
what the cooperation and verification mechanism (CVM) reports of the Commission 
track in new members like Bulgaria and Romania. As part of the CVM procedure, 
the Commission created benchmarks and set up monitoring teams to assess progress 
made in problematic areas such as corruption, and thus these reports, which have 
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been quite critical in the post accession period, play a large role in determining the 
perceptions of corruption in both countries (Vachudova 2009).  These perceptions 
are also shaped by the media, the program of the government, the state of the 
judiciary, etc.  While none of these are going to be consistent across countries (the 
media in one country may be largely controlled by friends of the corrupt or of the 
government, while the media in another country may be more scathing - and 
therefore create the perception of more corruption), when it comes to the EU 
accession stages and especially after a country has already become a full member, 
the fact that a country is finally tackling corruption and there is greater publicity may 
create the impression that there is more of it during a period when in fact there are 
finally measures to curb it. This theoretical intuition, which cannot be captured by 
the available data, suggests that even if certain post-accession backsliding is 
observed, this may not necessarily be the result of a true increase in corruption 
trends.  
A potential weakness of the CC index is that it measures the public’s general 
perception about corruption, which renders measuring different aspects or forms of 
corruption (nepotism, bribery, extortion etc) impossible (Heidenheimer 2005). 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study the CC’s advantages outweigh by far its 
shortcomings. It’s broad geographical coverage and the systematic aggregation of 
data from a variety of sources allows us to conduct effective cross-country 
comparisons of overall corruption trends over time and derive sensible and valid 
results.  
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An alternative measure that some studies have employed is the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which uses a similar 
methodological approach to produce its aggregate scores. There are two 
disadvantages of this index compared to the CC. First, it covers fewer countries and 
second it uses fewer sources to produce its aggregate scores. Having said that, I did 
run a correlation analysis to test for the level of overlap between the CPI and the CC 
in my sample and the high correlation coefficient of .972 indicated that the two 
indexes can basically be used interchangeably.  
 
Operationalization of the independent variables  -  EU Candidacy Process and Full 
Membership   
 The two independent variables of interest in this study are EU candidacy 
process and EU membership. EU candidacy process is defined as the period between 
the moment when a country has signed an association agreement with the EU (but 
has not yet entered accession negotiations) and the moment when full membership is 
achieved. Although the EU candidacy process goes through several stages starting 
with more general rather than specific conditionality and then moving to actively 
transposing the full acquis communautaire during the negotiations phase, looking at 
the process as a whole is a sensible approach given that both the softer inactive 
leverage of the initial phase and the active leverage of the negotiations phase exert 
powerful influence on acceding members. Per hypothesis 1, I expect a strong 
improvement in corruption levels during the Candidacy Process.  
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Table 1: Independent Variable – EU Candidacy Process 
Status Country and Period 
EU Candidacy Process 
Bulgaria 1996-2006, Czech Republic 
1996-2003, Estonia 1996-2003, Hungary 
1996-2003, Latvia 1996-2003, Lithuania 
1996-2003, Poland 1996-2003, Romania 
1996-2006, Slovakia 1996-2003, 
Slovenia 1996-2003 
 
 The second independent variable, EU membership, is defined as the moment 
when all the existing member states have ratified the Treaty of Accession and a 
country has become a full-fledged member of the Union. Importantly, at that point, 
the EU can no longer threaten to withhold membership in order to compel a country 
to comply with its demands, though it can use other types of leverage such as 
threatening to stop or stopping Structural and Cohesion Funds to new members. This 
considerable decrease of leverage after full membership is granted is interpreted by 
many as the main reason why new members can experience backsliding. Therefore, 
looking at corruption levels post accession is also extremely important for this study 
since it will show whether potential gains made during the candidacy process are 
sustainable. Per hypothesis 2, I expect that the strong improvement in corruption 
levels achieved during the candidacy period will be sustained in the post-
enlargement period.  
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Table 2: Independent variable – Full Membership 
Status Country and Period 
Full Membership 
Bulgaria 2007-2008, Czech Republic 
2004-2008, Estonia 2004-2008, Hungary 
2004-2008, Latvia 2004-2008, Lithuania 
2004-2008, Poland 2004-2008, Romania 
2007-2008, Slovakia 2004-2008, 
Slovenia 2004-2008 
 
 In the two regressions that follow I am assigning dummies to CEE candidate 
countries in accordance with the independent variables outlined above. For the first 
independent variable, EU accession process, a country receives a 1 if in any given 
year it is at any stage of the EU candidacy process (if it has signed an association 
agreement with the EU, is conducting accession negotiations, or has signed a Treaty 
of Accession). For years that the country is not part of the process it receives a 0. For 
the second independent variable, full membership, a country receives a 1 for any 
year in which it is a full member of the Union. Conversely, for years preceding the 
year of accession it receives a 0. There are no overlapping years and the eight post-
communist countries who joined in May 2004 receive a 1 for the entire 2004.  
 
Control Variables/Alternative Explanations 
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 In order to isolate the effects of the EU candidacy process and EU 
membership I refer to the academic literature on corruption to identify factors 
affecting corruption levels. Thus, the control variables included in the statistical 
analysis are: size of the public sector (government expenditure), level of economic 
development (GDP), level of economic competition (ratio of imports to GDP), level 
of democracy (Freedom in the World - average of political rights and civil liberties 
scores), freedom of the press, abundance of natural resources, ethnic fragmentation, 
and neighboring and diffusion effects. The time-sensitive control variables are 
lagged by one year because corruption perceptions may change slowly rather than 
immediately in response to these factors.  
 
1) Government Spending (General government final consumption expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP; United Nations Statistical Division) 
 
Several studies, including LaPalombara (1994), Rijckeghem and Weber (1997), 
Elliott (1997) employ this measure and argue that the incidence of corruption may be 
related to the size of the public sector. Intuitively, a system entailing more frequent 
and extensive intervention of the state in the economy may sometimes introduce 
more opportunities for corruption. Such opportunities include, but are not limited to, 
some of the most obvious forms of corruption, such as nepotism, bribery and 
extortion.  
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2)  Level of Economic Development (Log of GDP per capita; Economist 
Intelligence Unit, World Development Indicators) 
 
Studies by Kaufman et al (1999), Poirson (1998) and Leite & Weidmann (1999), 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003), and Dearden (2000) have all confirmed the significance 
of economic growth for corruption levels. Although the causal story varies somewhat 
among low, middle and high-income countries, the effects of economic growth on 
corruption are unquestionable and it therefore seems appropriate to include the log of 
GDP per capita as a proxy for level of economic development in a given country. 
 
3)  Competition (Imports as a percentage of GDP; United Nations Statistical 
Division) 
 
The intuition is that opportunities for corruption may increase due to the lack 
of competition in a national economy. This means that theoretically, more open 
economies must be less corrupt. Gerring and Thacker (2005) and Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) prove this correlation empirically by examining the precise relationship 
between trade openness and levels of political corruption. That is why using imports 
as a percentage of GDP (like Ades and Di Tella) to account for the level of 
competition in a national economy seems like a sensible choice. 
 
4) Level of Democracy (Freedom in the World: average of political rights and 
civil liberties scores; Freedom House)  
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 Montinola and Jackman (2002) present convincing evidence that democratic 
practices inhibit corruption especially after a threshold of democratic consolidation is 
passed. Boerzel, Stahn, and Pamuk (forthcoming) show that the level of corruption in 
the Eastern Europe is strongly connected to the success of democratic and economic 
reforms. Thus, including the Freedom in the World index as a proxy for level of 
democracy seems appropriate.  
 
5) Freedom of the Press (Freedom House) 
 
Many scholars argue that the media may serve as a powerful check on 
corruption.  Karkins (2005) finds that the media has proven to be one of the most 
effective promoters of anti-corrupt politics. Freille et al. (2005), in a 10-year panel 
study, find that restrictions on press freedom lead to higher levels of corruption. 
Holmes (2006) provides survey evidence on the effects of the media on public 
perceptions of corruption in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and China and 
concludes that the media in these countries cover corruption extensively, provide 
most of the knowledge that the public has of corruption, and therefore heavily 
influences the public's perception of corruption in state institutions. 
 
6)  Abundance of Natural Resources (Production of minerals and utilities as a 
percentage of GDP; United Nations Statistical Division) 
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 The intuition behind this variable is that abundance of natural resources may 
create opportunities for rent seeking and thus facilitate corrupt behavior. Leite and 
Weidemann (1999), Ades and Di Tella (1999), and Ross (2008) review such 
arguments and prove their statistical significance.  For the purposes of this study I 
will use production of fuels and minerals as a share of GNP to proxy for abundance 
of natural resources. 
 
7) Ethnic Fragmentation (RQ index developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol) 
 
Some scholars have argued that more ethnically heterogeneous environments 
may be conducive to the emergence of more extensive clientilistic networks and 
more corruption. Glaeser and Saks (2005), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2004), 
Holmes (2006), and Levitz and Pop Elelcech (2009) include ethnic fragmentation as 
a variable in their analyses on corruption.  
 
8)  Neighborhood and Diffusion Effects (Average corruption score of 
neighboring countries, as calculated from the World Bank’s Control of Corruption 
index). 
 Controlling for neighborhood and diffusion effects is also a very good idea. 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue that international interactions can affect norms and 
practices that one may think were determined by social and local factors. They focus 
specifically on corruption and show that corruption tends increase in countries 
surrounded by corrupt neighbors. Similar regional diffusion effects are also 
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extensively explored in the international political economy literature by Simmons et 
all (2008).  
 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
 
 The descriptive statistics, presented in Figure 1 below, provide some 
evidence for the hypotheses stated earlier. Seven out of the ten post-communist 
members experience a reduction in levels of corruption during the EU candidacy 
process. The trend looks particularly strong in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The evidence for hypothesis 2 is less convincing. Five out of the ten 
countries remain on their positive trajectory in the fight against corruption after 
attaining EU membership, but the other five look like they are experiencing some 
backsliding. It is extremely difficult, however, to make any conclusive arguments 
based only on these observations for it is not clear whether differences are 
statistically significant. That is why we next turn to a time-series cross-sectional 
regression analysis in order to examine the true effects of the EU candidacy process 
and membership on corruption levels in CEE countries. 
 
Fig. 1: Total Change in Levels of Corruption in Candidate Countries during the EU 
Candidacy Process and Post-Membership 
 
Note: Higher values indicate less corruption.  
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Table 3 below presents the results of the time-series cross-sectional analyses 
utilizing a Fixed Effects Regression Model (FE). After testing for unit effects and 
getting a significant F-score, I decided to account for such effects using a FE design. 
The Hausman test invariably rejected the random effects as an appropriate model, 
rendering fixed effects the most sensible choice. Fixed effects are particularly 
appropriate in studies like this, where unobservable country-specific characteristics 
and historical differences may affect the dependent variable in ways that the control 
variables by themselves cannot account for.  
The table includes three designs (Design 1, Design 2 and Design 3), the 
difference between which is the choice of the reference group – all countries from 
around the world in Designs 1, the 27 EU countries in Design 2, and only the post-
communist countries in Design 3. All three designs exhibit no autocorrelation. This 
was illustrated by the application of the Wooldrige test, for which the F-tests in the 
three designs were insignificant, meaning that we couldn’t reject H0 that there was 
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no autocorrelation. Moreover, none of the variables in either design seem to be 
collinear as all VIF-scores are below 10.  
 
Table 3:  The Effects of EU Candidacy and Membership on Corruption Levels 
 
Drivers Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 
EU Candidacy process 
.089** 
(.056) 
.173*** 
(.052) 
.112 *** 
(.055)     
Full Membership 
.116** 
(.064) 
.189*** 
(.063) 
.106*  
(.065)     
Level of Economic 
Development 
.156** 
(.077)     
.406* 
(.248) 
.451*** 
(.137)  
Neighbors’ corruption .093***   
(.033)   
.007 
(.101)   
.033 
(.094)     
Size of the Public sector .438*** 
(.162)      
-1.83*** 
(.586)      
.009** 
(.004)     
Competition -.062 
(.051)     
-.126 
(.169)     
-.000 
(.001)      
Natural resources -.421*** 
(.122)      
-.196 
(1.66)      
-.003 
(.003)    
Level of democracy 
(“Freedom in the 
World” score) 
-.068*** 
(.009)    
.015 
(.031)    
.090*** 
(.023)    
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Freedom of the press -.221*** 
(.073)  
-.439** 
(.196)  
-.002* 
(.001)  
Ethnic fragmentation -.002 
(.037)    
-.023 
(.038)    
-.043 
(.090)    
Constant -.289 
(.292) 
-.372 
(1.03) 
-1.71*** 
(.531) 
R-squared 0.63 0.26 0.83 
Number of Observations 1898 319 330 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. One-tailed 
tests for the independent variables. 
 
In Design 1 the reference group to which post-communist candidate states are 
compared consists of the entire set of non-candidate countries. Here we test whether 
a country’s inclusion in the EU candidacy process improves corruption levels in any 
way. Per Hypotheses 1 we expect that corruption would be declining while a country 
is part of the accession process. Per hypothesis 2 we expect that this trend will 
remain unchanged after membership is attained.  
The results of this analysis confirm both hypotheses. Relative to the base of 
non-candidate countries from around the world, CEE countries performed strongly, 
on average, (positive coefficient of .089) and statistically significantly (p-value: 
0.05) during the EU candidacy process. After accession, the candidate states did not 
experience backsliding (positive coefficient of .116) – a result that is statistically 
significant (p-value: 0.04). Thus, based on this analysis we can infer that the progress 
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made during the accession process led to sound and sustainable results that continued 
to be present in the post-membership period.  Six of the control variables, Level of 
Economic Development, Neighboring Corruption, Size of the Public Sector, Natural 
Resources, Level of Democracy, and Freedom of the Press were also found to be 
significant drivers of corruption levels. Although they are of no particular interest in 
the present study, these control variables have signs and levels of statistical 
significance broadly consistent with theory and prior studies. Incidentally, the 
negative coefficient on the freedom of the press variable is to be expected, since in 
this particular Freedom House assessment, higher scores correspond to less freedom. 
This is important because it also provides some evidence to the claim that the high 
visibility of the issue of corruption created by the media allowed EU leverage to 
work even in this area which was not explicitly emphasized in the acquis or the 
Copenhagen criteria. The high R-squared of the design, 63%, further underpins our 
confidence that these findings confirm the hypotheses that during the accession 
process corruption levels would be falling and that this process will remain stable 
even after membership has been obtained and when EU leverage has become 
weaker.  
In Design 2 the reference group to which post-communist candidate states are 
compared consists of the other EU members. The results of this analysis also confirm 
both the hypotheses. Relative to the base of old EU members, CEE countries 
performed strongly (positive coefficient of .173) and statistically significantly (p-
value: 0.001) both during the EU candidacy process and after they attained 
membership (positive coefficient of .189 and p-value: 0.003). However, we have to 
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be rather cautious with the interpretation of these results since old EU members had 
considerably lower levels of corruption to start with (hence less room and 
opportunities to improve). That is why it is not surprising that the CEE countries 
outperformed this base. Nevertheless, the results of this regression are important 
since they demonstrate that CEE countries are firmly set on a positive trajectory in 
their fight against corruption and are trying to catch up with their more developed 
and less corrupt Western European counterparts. Three of the control variables, 
Level of Economic Development, Size of the Public Sector, and Freedom of the 
Press were also found to be significant drivers of corruption levels.  
Design 3 restricts the sample to the candidate countries plus the non-
candidate post-communist states of the former Soviet bloc. The inclusion of this 
reference group serves a specific methodological goal – to separate the effect of the 
EU’s incentive-based approach from the set of potential domestic issues associated 
with the post-communist transition period that all these countries were part of. The 
results of Design 3 are consistent with the results of the previous two designs. 
Relative to the reference group of post-communist non-candidate states, candidate 
countries performed better both during the EU candidacy process and after 
membership, although the positive coefficient for the post-membership dummy is 
significant only at the 10% level for a one-tailed test (p-value 0.052).  Since the 
coefficient for the full membership period is barely significant, I also ran a joint F-
test for the variables indicating the two periods. In this way I was able to test the 
joint hypothesis that EU leverage, before and after accession, matters and corruption 
trends do indeed continue to deteriorate after accession. The positive coefficients for 
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the two periods and the significant F-score (p-value: 0.02) confirmed the joint 
hypothesis. Thus, we can safely say that the overall effect of EU leverage both 
during and after a country’s accession process matters and leads to a decrease in 
corruption levels. Four of the control variables, Level of Economic Development, 
Size of the Public Sector, Levels of Democracy and Freedom of the Press were also 
found to be significant drivers of corruption levels. The R-squared of this design is 
the highest, 83%, and the findings once again confirm both the hypotheses that 
before accession corruption would be falling and no backsliding will occur after 
membership has been obtained and EU leverage diminishes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VI. CAULSAL MECHANISMS 
The purpose of this section is to trace the causal mechanisms through which 
the EU was able to influence the fight against corruption before and after accession. 
Focusing first on the period before accession, although not part of the acquis or the 
Copenhagen criteria, progress in combating corruption became a recurrent theme in 
the Commission Regular Reports, which were becoming more detailed and specific 
as accession was approaching. This was partly due to the candidates’ desire for more 
explicit targets and for assurances that they are meeting all membership criteria 
(Grabbe 2006). By the early 2000s specific and detailed recommendations for anti-
corruption measures had replaced the vague and formalistic statements of the earliest 
reports (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2004). In fact, corruption had become such a salient 
issue that the EU built into Bulgaria and Romania’s accession treaty a safeguard 
clause (Article 39) allowing for a delay of accession by one year in the event of 
insufficient progress in tackling corruption. Importantly, such strictness was not 
confined only to these presumably more corrupt countries. The EU consistently 
noted the prevalence of corruption in Hungary as a problem and identified public 
procurement as an area of concern in both the 1999 and 2000 Regular Reports. The 
situation was similar in the 1999 Regular Report on Latvia and in the 2002 Regular 
Report on Poland asserting that corruption “threatens to undermine the functioning 
of many public spheres” (Regular Reports 1999; 2000; 2002). This is just a sample 
of several reports, but corruption was a central issue in many. Furthermore, the 
issuance of every report was followed by enormous publicity in the media, thus 
forging a significant level of domestic pressure for compliance as well. Thus, since 
corruption was clearly a highly visible and salient issue, EU leverage was 
substantial.  In other words, the incentives for candidates to decrease levels of 
corruption during the accession period were high since this decrease was directly tied 
to their prospects of qualifying for membership. 
The more interesting question, however, is what mechanisms have prevented 
potential backsliding after accession when EU leverage has become weaker. I argue 
that there are three mechanisms in play that compensate for the presumed loss of 
leverage after membership: continued leverage (Structural and Cohesion Funds and 
CVM reports), increased linkage (socialization effects), and spillover effects from 
other parts of the acquis (reduction of the role of the state in the economy and 
improvements in the legal system).  
First, after accession new members become eligible for significant amounts 
of Structural and Cohesion Funds (S&C funds) (about 1/3 of the EU budget). These 
members’ dependence on conditional EU funding (which can be cut off in cases of 
non-compliance as it happened in Bulgaria), therefore, continues to promote 
governance reforms. Furthermore, in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania a 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was instituted to ensure that both 
countries comply with their commitments. Progress in fighting corruption has thus 
far always been a special focus in these reports. To elaborate a little on how the 
leverage of S&C funds translates into pressure for reform, I will now turn to a brief 
case-specific discussion of Bulgaria and Romania.  
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In response to a corruption scandal in Bulgaria with two officials of the 
National Road Agency in January 2008, the Commission exercised its leverage by 
cutting off funding for road construction. Importantly, the investigation was initiated 
by a scathing article in Bulgaria’s leading business newspaper, Kapital. In February 
and March the Commission froze Phare and SAPARD funding in light of more 
corruption allegations in the ministries of finance and regional development. As a 
result of its failure to address its looming corruption, Bulgaria ended up with two 
ministerial resignations, an irreversible loss of 220 and a freezing of 340 million 
Euro. Although the 340 million were later on unfrozen, Bulgarian authorities, and 
most specifically the new Prime Minister Boiko Borisov realized that the time has 
come to “wage a full-scale war” on corruption. In early 2010 during operation 
“Octopus” (“Октопод”) the government was able to expose and arrest high ranking 
public officials (associated with the State Agency for National Security with 
jurisdictions to fight corruption) involved in money laundering, tax evasion and 
siphoning money from a now-defunct steelmaker, among other allegations 
(Liubomirska 2010). A few months earlier during the operation “Insolent Bastards” 
(“Наглите”) the Borisov government was able to deal a major blow against 
organized crime by arresting a number of mafia members involved in kidnappings, 
contract killings, and trafficking.  
In 2007 the Commission threatened to freeze agricultural funds to Romania 
unless the country filled some corruption-inducing gaps in its payments system. 
Reforms were quickly implemented and allegations of corruption led to the 
resignation of Romania’s justice minister Tudor Chiuariu two months later (Ivanov 
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forthcoming). All these developments where closely and extensively covered by a 
series of EU monitoring reports and the media, which criticized Bulgaria and 
Romania and called for more intense efforts to curb corruption (CVM Reports June 
2007; February 2008; July 2008).  
Thus, the EU was clearly able to continue to exert leverage over all its new 
members through the threat of cutting off conditional funding in cases of non-
compliance and through the actual freezing of such funding in the case of Bulgaria. 
For Bulgaria and Romania this means of exercising leverage was further supplanted 
by the implementation of the CVM. CVM reports track and assess progress against 
corruption (and other commitments), thus establishing a direct monitoring system, 
which allowed the EU to continue to exert a sustained pressure for reform. 
The second mechanism that translates EU influence into domestic changes is 
the diffusion of democratic norms and values.  This includes increasing linkages 
between new and old EU members, exemplified in more travel and work 
opportunities in the West for CEE citizens, greater mass media exposure, more joint-
business ventures etc, all contributing to greater expectations for good governance 
(Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2009). In a study focusing specifically on the lack of new 
EU members’ backsliding along an array of indicators Levitz and Pop-Eleches find a 
strong negative correlation between international travel and share of CEE citizens 
living in Western Europe and corruption levels. These findings strongly align with 
the growing literature on socialization effects (Checkel 2005; Gheciu, 2005; Epstein 
and Seledmeier 2008).  
 35
In explaining the puzzling lack of backsliding in CEE countries, Sedelmeier 
suggests focusing on the “greater susceptibility of the new member states to 
shaming” (Sedelmeier 2008, p.806). He argues that extended linkages with the West 
could have made CEE citizens more sensitive about public shaming and more 
demanding as far as compliance goes through a process of socialization. Levitz and 
Pop-Eleches add to this argument by empirically showing that East Europeans 
working and traveling abroad are steadily turning into an electorate with higher 
expectations about the rule of law and corruption standards, thus exerting an 
important positive impact on the political culture in their home countries.  
The third mechanism explaining the lack of backsliding in corruption levels 
after accession can be attributed to spillover effects from the gradual removal of the 
state from the economy, from stricter and more effective regulatory institutions, and 
from improvements in the legal system as a result of the implementation of the 
acquis. Using descriptive statistics from the World Bank, I show that the 
governments in the 10 post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007 have decreased their spending as a percentage of GDP, have encouraged 
privatization and the growth of the private sector, and have improved the quality of 
the civil service, the police and the courts. All these developments are likely to either 
limit opportunities for corruption or combat it more effectively.  
In all of the figures that follow, the ten post-communist countries that are 
depicted are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Figures 2 and 3 pertain to the diminishing 
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role of the state in the economy and figures 4 and 5 pertain to the evolution of more 
effective regulatory institutions and an improved legal system. 
Figure 2 below shows a declining trend in government expenditure starting in 
2003. This suggests that shortly before the enlargement took place the role of the 
state of the economy had already started to decline. 
 
Fig. 2: Government Expenditure in the 10 post-communist members of the EU 
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Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi 
 
Figure 3 below shows a constant improvement in the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development since the early 2000s.  
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Fig. 3: Government Promotion of Private Sector Development 
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Both Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the role of the state in the economy has 
undergone a considerable reduction since the early 2000s. This conclusion is not 
surprising given the EU’s emphasis on the privatization of state owned enterprises, 
the reduction of price regulation and the decrease of subsidies. These policy 
prescriptions followed from the criticisms included in the Regular Reports produced 
by the Commission and also reflect specific targets and objectives from several of 
the chapters of the acquis. Chapter 6, Competition Policy, covers both anti-trust and 
state aid control policies. It includes rules and procedures to fight anti-competitive 
behavior by companies and to prevent governments from granting state aid which 
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distorts competition in the internal market. Related to this, Chapter 11, Economic 
and Monetary Policy, contains specific rules prohibiting privileged access of the 
public sector to financial institutions. Finally, chapters 15, Industrial Policy, and 16, 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, promote privatization and industrial strategies 
enhancing internal and external competitiveness. Thus, given that the 
implementation of these chapters preceded, for the most part, the periods when we 
observe less state subsidies and better promotion of private sector development, it is 
likely that it was precisely the development of these EU-driven institutional 
capacities that played a key role in generating the observed outcomes. 
Figure 4 below shows an improving trend in the quality of public and civil 
services and the degree of their independence from political pressures as well as the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies since the mid-1990s. An insignificant 
slowdown in the trend occurs after the 2007 enlargement.  
Fig. 4: Quality of Public and Civil Service 
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Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi 
 
Figure 5 below also shows an improving trend in the level of confidence that 
societal actors have in the quality of the police and the courts. The trend becomes 
even more pronounced after the 2007 enlargement. 
 
Fig. 5: Quality of the Police and the Courts 
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Focusing on government effectiveness and the quality of civil and public 
service, we can say that the adoption of the acquis governing the internal market and 
other common policies (in particular, environment, labor relations, agriculture, 
transport and energy) represented a massive re-regulatory exercise in these countries. 
The removal of regulatory differences between the member states in the Single 
Market was paralleled by a transformation of regulatory standards, i.e. setting EU 
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wide common standards and practices, which in most cases meant a significant 
improvement in the effectiveness and quality of the work of state agencies in the 
post-communist members. 
As far as the quality of the police and courts is concerned, Chapter 24 of the 
acquis, Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, emphasizes the 
establishment of an independent and efficient judiciary combined with a firm 
commitment devoting adequate financial resources and training to employees of the 
judicial system. Again, therefore, improvements in civil and public services and in 
the judiciary can be attributed to the systematic implementation of the acquis.  
To sum up, before accession, CEE leaders had strong incentives to try to curb 
corruption since it was a highly salient issue specifically emphasized in the 
Commission Regular Reports. The asymmetric power relationship between the EU 
and the candidate members allowed the EU to effectively use its leverage to induce 
change even in areas that were not formally in the acquis or the Copenhagen criteria, 
such as corruption. After accession, the relative loss of leverage was compensated by 
three mechanisms which sustained the pressure for reform and prevented 
backsliding: continued leverage (Structural and Cohesion Funds and CVM reports), 
increased linkage (socialization effects), and spillover effects (reduction of the role 
of the state in the economy and improvements in the legal system) from 
implementing the acquis in other areas.  
 
 
 
  
VII. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
This study was able to find support for both of the hypotheses proposed. 
Corruption levels do indeed start improving as soon as a country joins the EU 
candidacy process and progress in curbing corruption continues even after accession, 
when EU leverage becomes weaker. Nevertheless there are three methodological 
challenges to this study that are worth mentioning. First, although the CC is based on 
a number of individual variables measuring perceptions of corruption, representing 
35 separate data sources, it is possible that interviewees may sometimes conflate 
their perception of corruption with their perception of general government 
performance. Second, it is methodologically difficult to disentangle the effect of the 
EU candidacy process from a potential selection effect suggesting that these 10 post-
communist countries were going to have lower levels of corruption as opposed to 
other uninvited countries anyway. Third, some studies (e.g. Rose and Mishler 
forthcoming) have suggested the possibility that perception of corruption may be 
closely linked to perceptions of economic performance. 
In order to test whether CC scores indeed correspond to people’s perception 
of corruption and not their perception of general government performance, I looked 
at how corruption levels changed in Bulgaria and Romania after the two countries’ 
watershed elections in 1997 and 1996 respectively which removed from power 
governments with poor performance. The general level of disapproval of the illiberal 
governments in the two countries prior to these elections was very high, but it is 
unlikely that corruption levels underwent a fundamental transformation in the first 
year after the elections. The score for Bulgaria in 1997 is -.54 and for 1998 -.29, a 
significant improvement of .25. This simple calculation suggests that there is indeed 
reason to suspect that people’s perception of corruption and their perception of 
general government performance are closely linked. The score for Romania in 1996 
is -.25 and for 1997 - .30, an insignificant deterioration in corruption levels (-.05). 
This result defies the previous intuition that perception of corruption and perception 
of general government performance are conflated. Nevertheless, if CC sometimes 
fails to capture the true perception of corruption, perhaps it is worth considering 
other measures, such as number of anticorruption verdicts, or trying to build a latent 
variable by combining several of the available indexes.  
The second challenge to the results of this study has to do with the fact it is 
methodologically challenging to evaluate the impact of the EU on corruption in CEE 
because the application of conditionality coincided with the fundamental political 
transition that these countries underwent after the collapse of their communist 
regimes. Additionally, EU incentives were strongest in those countries whose 
domestic conditions were most conducive to democratization and adaptation to free 
market economics. Therefore, any improvements in corruption levels that we 
observe may be due primarily to domestic factors or to the ability of the EU to 
cherry-pick the countries with the best reform conditions rather than to its ability to 
induce change that these countries would have been unable or unwilling to initiate 
otherwise.   
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This study, however, tries to control for some of this dynamic by comparing 
the 10 post-communist countries to a reference group of the communist countries 
were never part of the EU’s incentive-based conditionality. After all these countries 
underwent similar transitions and were in some respects similar to the 10 new 
members of the EU. As the results of Design 3 show, the 10 post-communist 
countries performed strongly relative to this base.  
The third challenge to the results of this study stems from the fact that the 
dependent variable, perceptions of corruption, may be closely linked to and 
determined by perceptions of economic performance. Figure 6 below shows that 
such a link does indeed exist and the correlation coefficient of .78 further reinforces 
this idea. Nevertheless, in light of the larger corruption literature (Kaufman et al 
(1999), Dearden (2000) etc), it should not be surprising that corruption levels would 
indeed deteriorate with economic growth.  
 
Fig. 6: Economic Growth and Corruption Perception 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
The ten post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 
constitute a special case in the history of EU enlargement marked by unprecedented 
EU leverage which translated into a systemic overhaul of these countries’ political, 
economic, and legal systems.  By the end of their long and painful transitions that 
took most of the 1990s, the majority of CEE states had declared that joining the EU 
was their top foreign policy goal (Vachudova 2005). There were multiple reasons for 
this preference, from political and geo-strategic (locking in democracy, guaranteeing 
national security vis-à-vis Russia, reducing uncertainty by regulating relations with 
powerful West European states) to economic (eliminating trade barriers, receiving 
subsidies, obtaining a voice in the decision-making process of CEE’s most powerful 
trading partner). Small, economically weak, and politically vulnerable, the CEE 
countries needed the EU much more than the EU needed them. Thus, this 
asymmetrical interdependence provided the EU with a solid bargaining position and 
allowed it to impose comprehensive and intrusive membership conditions that went 
beyond the scope of the acquis and the Copenhagen criteria.  
Although compliance in certain areas did indeed deteriorate in the post-
accession period when EU leverage had diminished, this study finds convincing 
evidence that this was not the case with corruption. Although it remains a hot topic 
and an area of continued criticism for many of these countries, absolute gains in 
progress against corruption have been sustained even after membership. Although 
corruption was neither part of the acquis nor of the Copenhagen criteria, it was an 
issue that received tremendous visibility during the accession period through the 
Commission Regular Reports and the attention of the media in the CEE countries. 
Taking advantage of its leverage, the EU was able to demand reforms that served to 
curb corruption levels during the Candidacy period. Importantly, gains in the fight 
against corruption were not negated after accession. This study has identified three 
mechanisms that compensated for the relative loss of leverage in this time period.  
First, the EU was able to continue to exert some leverage and thus sustain 
pressure for reform through the threat of cutting off conditional funding in cases of 
non-compliance. Having acted on this threat once, in the case of Bulgaria, the EU 
demonstrated that this was a real and credible punishment mechanism, which it can 
use if serious violations are uncovered. Secondly, increased linkages between 
Western and Eastern Europe, exemplified in the number of people traveling and 
working in the West, led to the gradual emergence of an electorate of more 
“Europeanized” CEE citizens with higher expectations about the rule of law and 
corruption. Such socialization effects serve as the silent underpinnings of a new 
political culture, one that holds politicians to higher standards and demands good 
governance at all costs. As opinion polls have indicated, Central and Eastern 
Europeans are a lot more pro-EU than their Western European counterparts and are 
therefore unwilling to risk marginalization with respect to the EU for lack of 
compliance. Thirdly, spillover effects associated with the reduction of the role of the 
state in the economy and improvements in the legal system and the strengthened 
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effectiveness of regulatory institutions as a result of the implementation of the acquis 
either limit opportunities for corruption or allow for more conducive conditions to 
tackle it. 
Nevertheless, absolute improvements in corruption levels in CEE countries 
do not necessarily mean that a bright future is inevitable. These countries still remain 
much more corrupt than the Western European members and corruption continues to 
undermine economic progress and the citizens’ faith in the democratic system. That 
is why pressure for reform should persist and perhaps more detailed studies focusing 
on particular aspects of corruption should be encouraged, so that both the EU and the 
CEE governments can collectively come up with more targeted and effective 
strategies to tackle this serious and endemic challenge.  
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